Chief WINK Investigates Reporter Chorus Nylander
•5/11/2026

MIAMI, Fla. (WINK) — It has been three decades since the silence of the Florida Everglades was shattered by the impact of ValuJet Flight 592.
While the physical scars on the landscape have long since faded, the investigative legacy of that day continues to protect millions of passengers boarding flights every year.
For Gregory Feith, the lead investigator for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) at the time, the memories of May 11, 1996, remain vivid.
"I speak about it often," Feith said. "ValuJet was a turning point when it came to really drawing out and recognizing in-flight fires."
The flight, bound for Atlanta, was in the air for less than ten minutes before a catastrophic fire forced the crew to attempt an emergency return to Miami. They never made it. The DC-9 slammed into the jagged sawgrass and muck at over 400 miles per hour.
Feith and his team arrived to find a scene that was as dangerous as it was somber. The aircraft had fragmented upon impact, leaving a massive crater submerged in the swamp.
The recovery effort lasted three grueling months. Investigators worked in biohazard suits and chest-high waders to protect themselves from jet fuel and biological hazards, all while navigating 90-degree heat and the local wildlife.
"We had sharpshooters on the airboats," Feith recalled. "They would take potshots at the water to scare the gators. And we had a lot of snakes."
The investigation eventually centered on a deadly cargo: 144 expired chemical oxygen generators that had been improperly packaged and loaded onto the plane.
When one generator accidentally triggered, it generated intense heat, triggering the others. The resulting inferno in the forward cargo hold was fueled by the very oxygen the canisters were designed to produce. At the time, cargo holds were "Class D"—meaning they were designed to be airtight to suffocate fires. However, because the canisters provided their own oxygen, the fire was uncontainable.
"We saw the trend, we saw the need," Feith said. "We moved the industry to get rid of these Class D cargo holds and move them to full suppression."
The tragedy sparked a fierce battle between safety advocates and an industry resistant to the high cost of retrofitting aircraft. Ultimately, the NTSB’s recommendations led to a global shift. Today, commercial aircraft are equipped with smoke detectors and fire suppression systems in every cargo compartment.
For the families of the 110 people lost, there is no such thing as closure. But for Feith, the work done in the muck of the Everglades ensured those lives were not lost in vain.
"They don't have those 30 years of memories to make with their friends, family, loved ones," Feith said. "But if I can help them understand what occurred... their loved one did not die in vain."
The Safety Reforms: How Flight 592 Changed the Skies
The investigation into the ValuJet tragedy revealed critical flaws in aviation regulations that had been overlooked for decades. The NTSB’s findings forced the FAA to implement sweeping changes that remain the gold standard for airline safety today.
1. Elimination of Class D Cargo Holds
Before 1996, many short-haul aircraft used "Class D" cargo compartments. These were unventilated areas designed to suppress fires by starving them of oxygen. The ValuJet crash proved this was a "passive" and unreliable strategy, especially if the fire source—like oxygen generators—produced its own fuel.
The Change: The FAA mandated that all Class D compartments be upgraded to Class C.
The Result: This required installing active fire detection (smoke sensors) and fire suppression systems (Halon gas) in all cargo holds.
2. Strict Regulation of Chemical Oxygen Generators
The primary cause of the fire was the improper transport of chemical oxygen generators (COGs). These devices, which provide emergency oxygen to passengers, can reach temperatures of nearly 260°C ($500^{\circ}\text{F}$) when activated.
The Change: The FAA banned the transport of chemical oxygen generators as cargo on passenger aircraft.
The Requirement: Any COGs being shipped must now have protective caps to prevent accidental activation and be stored in specialized, fire-resistant packaging.
3. Enhanced Hazardous Materials Training
The investigation found that ValuJet’s maintenance contractor, SabreTech, had improperly labeled and handled the generators.
The Change: The "ValuJet Rule" led to a total overhaul of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) training for airline employees and contractors.
The Result: It established more rigorous oversight of third-party maintenance providers to ensure safety protocols are followed as strictly as they are within the airlines themselves.
4. Improved Pilot Reporting & Procedures
The cockpit voice recorder showed the pilots were overwhelmed by smoke and conflicting information almost immediately.
The Change: Training for "Smoke and Fume" events was revamped to emphasize immediate descent and landing over troubleshooting.
The Result: Pilots are now trained to get the plane on the ground as quickly as possible, the moment smoke is detected, rather than spending precious minutes trying to locate the source.
These mandates were not without controversy, as they cost the airline industry hundreds of millions of dollars to implement. However, in the 30 years since the ValuJet crash, there has not been a single fatal fire caused by cargo-hold ignition on a U.S. commercial passenger airline.